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[L. A. No. 26196. In Dank. May 21, 1962.] 
Estate of JACK ROBBINS, Deceased. IRVINE ROBBINS, 
as Administrator with the Will Annexed, Petitioner and 
Appellant, v. LEE MISHKIN, Claimant and Respondent. 
[1] Charities-Charitable Trusts-Validity.-A testamentary trust 
providing that income of the trust, or as much of the principal 
as in the sole discretion of the trustees would be deemed neces-
sary or advisable, was to be used for the care and support of 
minor Negro children whose father or mother had been im-
prisoned as a result of a crime or misdemeanor of a political 
nature was a valid charitable trust. 
[2] ld.-Charitable Trusts-Requisites.-A bequest is charitahle if 
it is made for a charitable purpose, its aims and accomplish-
ments are of religious, ed ucational, political or general social 
interest to mankind, and the ultimate recipients constitute 
either the community as a whole or an unascertainable and 
indefinite portion thereof. 
[3] ld.-Charitable Trusts-Validity.-A testamentary provision 
for the "care, comfort, support, medical attention, education, 
sustenance, maintenance or custody" of minor children who 
have been deprived of normal home life by the incarceration 
of one or both of their parents is unquestionably of social 
value so as to constitute the basis for a valid charitable trust. 
Any risk that a parent might be induced to commit a crime 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Charities, § 32 et seq.; Am.Jur., Charities, 
§ 12 et seq. 
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Charities, §§ 2, 3; Am.Jur., Charities, § 4. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 7, 8] Charities, § 3; [2] Charities, 
§ 2; [4] Charities, § 25; [5] Charities, § 19; [6] Charities, § 1. 
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he otherwise would not cOllallit because of the possibility that 
his child might become a beneficiary of the trust is far out-
weighed by the interests of the innocent children involved 
and society's intercst in them. 
[4] ld.-Beneficiaries.-By providing that income of a testamen-
tary trust, or as much of the principal as in the sole discretion 
of the trustees would be deemed necessary or advisahle, wns 
to be used for the care and support of minor Negro children 
whose father or mother had been imprisoned as a result of a 
crime or misdemeanor of a political nature, the testator 
selected a class of beneficiaries constituting an indefinite part 
of the community and provided adequate standards to guide 
his trustees in administering the trust. These children re-
quired special care and attention, and it was immaterial thaI 
the beneficiaries were not limited to children in financial need. 
[5] ld.-Benefit not to Relieve Poverty.-Relief of proverty is not 
a condition of charitable assistance. If the benefit conferred 
has a sulileiently widespread social value, a charitable purpose 
exists. 
[6] Id.-Definition.--As commonly understood in modern usage, 
"charity" does not refer only to aid to the poor and destitute 
and exclude all humanitarian activities which are maintained 
to care for the physical and mental well-being of the r ecipients, 
and which make it less likely that such recipients will become 
burdens on society. 
[7] ld.-Charitable Trnsts-Validity.-It is the purpose for which 
property is to be used, not the motives of the testator, that 
determines whether a testamentary trust is a valid charitable 
trust. 
[8] ld.-Charitable Trusts--Validity.-Assistnnce to the minor 
beneficiaries of a testamentary trust providing that income 
of the trust, or as much of the principal as in the sole dis-
cretion of the trustces would be deemed necessary or advis-
able, was to be used for the care and support of minor Negro 
children whose father or mother had been imprisoned as a 
result of a crime or misdemeanor of a political nature was 
for a valid charitahle purpose. The risk that such assistance 
might sen-e to encourage crime was far more remote than thnt 
which the Legislature might have created by provision for the 
care of children that extends to those of convicted prisoners, 
and the benefit to society offered by the testator transcended 
whatever criticism there might be of his motives, which died 
with him. 
[4J See Cal.Jur.2d, Charities, § 48; Am.Jur., Charities, § 28 et 
seq. 
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APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Allgel,~s 
County determining a testamentary trust to be invalid amI 
denying a new trial. Harold W. Schweitzer, Judge. Ordf!l' 
determining iuvalidity of trust, reversed; appeal from other 
order dismissed. 
Brock, Fleishman & Rykoff and Hugh R. 1!anes for Peti-
tioner and Appellant. 
John T. McTernan, David B. Finkel, A. L. Wirin and Fred 
B. Okrand as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Ap-
pellant. 
Pacht, Ross, Warne & Bernhard, Clore Warne, Harvey M. 
Grossman and Ira E. Bilson for Claimant and Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J .-In his will the testator divided his estate 
into Fund A consisting of "cash, securities and money in the 
bank" and Fund B consisting of "a parcel of real estate 
situated in Los Angeles, California, and improved with two 
(2) single family residences, together with furniture, fixtures, 
personal belongings and library contained therein." He 
directed that the assets comprising Fund B be sold and the 
cash distributed to three named trustees in trust. "The income 
of said trust, or so much of the principal as in the sole discre-
tion of the Trustees may be deemed desirable or advisable, 
is to be used for the care, comfort, support, medical attention, 
education, sustenance, maintenance or custody of such minor 
Negro child or children, whose father or mother, or both, have 
been incarcerated, imprisoned, detained or committed in any 
federal, state, county or local prison or penitentiary, as a 
result of the conviction of a crime or misdemeanor of a politi-
cal nature." He then set forth illustrative examples of crimes 
of a political nature for the guidance of the trustees in the 
exercise of their discretion and stated his reasons for creating 
the trust. l 
>" In order to clarify my intention and make clear to my Trustees 
what I mean or intend to be meant by crimes or misdemeanor of a 
political nature, the following examples are offered for the guidance of 
my Trustees: 
"1. The prosecution, conviction ana incarceration resulting from a 
purported ,iQ)ation of any federal, state or local statute, ordinance or 
regulation, seeking to proscribe, limit, abolish, enjoin or regulate the 
teaching, advising, adopting, ad,ocating or implementing any political, 
geopolitical, or social·political doctrine, thesis, theory or philosophy, or 
speaking or writing in support thereof . I cite the Smith Act of the 
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In this proceeding to determine heirship (Prob. Code, 
§ 1080) the di::;position of Fund .A is not in dispute, but Lee 
Mishkin, a grandnephew of the testator, challenges the validity 
of the Fund B trust. The trial court determined that the trust 
is invalid. Since the will contained no residuary clause, the 
court entered an order determining that the property be-
queathed to the trustees should pass by the law of intestate 
succession. The administrator-with-the-will-annexed appeals. 
[1] We agree with the contention of the administrator 
that the testator established a valid charitable trust. The 
trustees, the beneficiaries, and the trust purpose are all stated. 
Federal Go,ernment and the prosecutions resulting thereunder as an 
example of this paragraph. 
"2. The prosecution, conviction and incarceration resulting from any 
contempt citation arising out of the refusal to answer any question or 
questions concerning the religious, social, economic or political opinions, 
beliefs, persuasions or affiliations, past and present, as may be propounded 
by any federal, state or local committee or sub-committee, or by any 
legislative committee of any state or municipality or of the Congress 
of the United States. I cite the appearances before the Un-American 
Activities Committee or the Internal Securities Committee of the United 
States Congress and subsequent prosecutions flowing therefrom as appro· 
priate exnmples of this paragraph. 
"3. The prosecution, conviction and incarceration resulting from the 
refusal to execute any affidavit, certification or other statement, whether 
under oath, or not under oath, requiring [sic] into the political affiliations, 
heliefs or association of the affiant; or the prosecution, conviction or 
incarceration which may result from the execution of a purported false 
statement, aflida.,-it or certification as to the past or present political 
affiliations, beliefs or associations of the affiant. I cite the prosecutions 
under the non-Communist affida.,-it of the Taft-Hartley Act, or the prose-
cutions flowing from the McCarron-Walters Immigration Act, or the 
prosecutions and proceedings filed under the so-caUed Broyle's Bill of 
the State of Illinois, or prosecutions pursued by the Un-American 
Acti,-ities Committees of the .,-arious states as appropriate examples 
of this paragraph_ 
"4_ The prosecution, conviction and incarceration resulting from any 
activity in the organization, or assisting in the organization, of any trade 
union movement; or from the violation of any injunction of any court, 
restraining, enjoining or limiting in any way the activities of any union 
of working men and women in the United States, or restricting and limit· 
ing the right to collectively bargain or go out on strike_ 
"The above examples are cited for illustration purposes only, so as 
to enable and .assist my said Trustees to determine what, in their own 
collecti.,-e opinion, shall constitute a crime or misdemeanor of a political 
nature, in accordance with the uses and purposes of this trust_ It is 
my intention, howe"er, and I do by these presents vest in my said 
Trustees the full and complete power and authority to determine accord· 
ing to their sole and best judgment what is now, or what in the future 
may constitute, con"iction of a crime or misdemeanor of a political 
nature_ I am aware and cognizant that the law is an ambulatory institu-
tion and accordingly is subject to constant change_ I anticipate that 
subsequent to the execution of these presents or subsequent to the date 
of my demise, laws, statutes and regulations, other than those presently 
in full force and effect, may be adopted by the Congress of the United 
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[2] "A bequest is charitable if: (1) It is made for a 
charitable purpose; its aims and accomplishments are of reli-
gions, educational, political or general social interest to man-
kind. [Citations.] (2) The ultimate recipients constitute 
either the community as a whole or an unascertainable and 
indefinite portion thereof. [Citations.]" (Estatc of H cnde1'-
son, 17 Ca1.2d 853, 857 [112 P.2d 605]. ) [3] Provision for 
States or by the respecti,e legisl::ttures of the se,eral states, which will 
~r may be calculated to limit, abolish or circumscribe the field of activity 
in unorthodox or unpopular polit ical or economic causes or philosophies; 
and that people will Le arrested, convicted and imprisoned as a result 
t.herefrom. Accordingly, and with full cognizance of this eventuality, 
I herehy endow my said TruBtees, in their sole discretion an,l in accord-
ance with their best collectiye judgment, to determine who shall r eceive 
the benefits of this trust estate. :r,ry only stipulation to my said Trustees 
is that the r ecipients be the minor ~egro children of such defendants .... 
"I am aware of the unusual aml unorthodox pro, is ions in this testa-
ment generally, and particularly with regard to the creation of the trust 
estate, and the purposes and uses for which it is created. 1:northodoxy 
or lack of conformity ha,e never been a deterrent or governing factors 
in my life. They shall play ' no governing or deterring role in my death 
or in the disposition of my estate arter death. Nevertheless, somc small 
word or mention should be made by way of explaining the reasons and 
hasis for the creation of the trust estate set forth herein and created 
hereby. 
"I have ahvays believed in the full, complete and unabridged freedom 
of expression in a democratic society, including (but not limited to) 
freedom to write, freed om to espouse and freedom to advocnte. To limit 
these freeuoms to the majority, or to confine these fr.;edoms to the 
protagonists of the orthodox or popular, is to negate or abolish the whole 
democratic concept of freedom of e:.:pression; for in the final analysis, the 
majority, the orthodox and the conformists have no need for this legal 
immunity or protection-they already have it . It is the minority, the 
unpopular, the advocate of the unorthodox who requires nnd who must 
have the unahridged and inalienahle right to differ and be heard . 
,. In my lifetime, I have, from time to time, been associated and 
nffiliated with causes, campaigns, beliefs and organizations ad,ocating 
or espousing unorthodox or unpopular roncepts, and I have livcd to see 
many of these coneepts and philosophies accepted and heralded many 
years later as part of thc sorinl, politicnl and economic progress of Ollr 
society, fully accepted and recognized as naturnl and respectable con· 
comitants of the dcmocratic processes. Yet during the early struggles 
on uehnlf of th cse .nme canseS or bcliefs, men and women were perse· 
<'atetl, os tracized nnll somd illl es jailed, and their fnmilks left destitute 
nnd devoid of allmcans of sllpport nnd maintenance. I ha,e learned from 
a long line of such experiences that thcrc nre occns;ons when to differ 
or to dissent may well place one's own security and the security of one's 
f~lllil~' in jeopardy: However, I have nlso lcnrncd thnt irresprcti,e of 
this .ieopnr,ly. certnin brn'-~ an,l intrepid men and women will always 
ia, ;st OIl heing hea rd, their personnl security notwithstanding. 
"It is Leca use 1 wish to presen'C the right to dissent, the right to 
c1i~er :md to he different, that I havc created the trust estnte set up in 
this will. It is my last contribution to a more democratic way of life for 
all people. 
"'1'1Ie right to disagree, thc right to dis5ent, the right to be different, 
these are wnrp nnd "oof of the f~. ),ric of demoerncy, they are the ferti-
lizers that feed and nurture the tree of liberty and freedom." 
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thc "l:arc, comfo rt, support, medical attention, education, sus-
tcnance, mainteuallce or custody" of minor children who have 
becn deprived of normal home life by the incarceration of one 
or both of their parents is unquestionably of social value. 
Any risk that a parent might be induced to commit a crime he 
othcnri:;e would not commit because of the possibility that 
his thild might bccome a bcneficiary of this trust is far out-
weighed by the intcrests of the innocent children involved 
and socicty's interest in them. To hold othcrwise would, as 
stated in another context, "incorporate into the law of the 
land, as legal precepts, the sayings that the sins of fathers are 
visited upon their children (Westbrook v. Railroad, 66 Miss. 
loco cit. 569 [6 So. 321, 14 Am .St.Rep. 587]), and that the 
child's teeth must be set on edge because the father has eaten 
sour grapes. (B . & I. Ra1'lroad CO. V. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 
loco cit. 409 [98 Am .Dce. 175])." (Neff V. City of Cameron, 
213 Mo. 350, 3GO [111 S.W . 1139] ; see also Zm'zana v. N eve 
Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32, 34-37 [179 P. 203, 15 A .L.R. 401] ; 
R eynolds V. Willson, 51 CaJ.2d 94, 102 [331 P .2d 48].) 
[ 4] The t estator selected a class of beneficiarics consti-
tuting an indefinite part of the community and provided 
adequate standards to guide his trustees in administering the 
trust. (Estate of BU1!Jl, 33 Cal.2d 897, 901-904 [206 P.2d 
635], and authorities cited.) Like the aged beneficiaries in 
Estate of H endel'son, supra, 17 Cal.2d 853, Fl'edericka Home 
for the Aged v. C011nty of San Diego, 35 CaJ.2d 789 [221 P .2d 
68], and Estate of Tarrant, 38 Cal.2d 42 [237 P.2d 505, 28 
A.L.R.2d 419], these children require spec ial care and atten-
tion, and it is immaterial that the bcneficiaries are not limited 
to children in financial need. [ 5 ] "Relief of pOYerty is not 
a condition of charitable assistance. If the benefit conferred 
has a sufficiently widespread social value, a charitable pur-
pose exists." (E state of Henderson, S11pra, 17 Ca1.2d 853, 
857; see also Estate of Tarrant, supra, 38 Cal.~d 42, 50. ) 
[6] "In short, as the word' charity' is commonly under-
stood in model'll usage, it does not refer only to aid to the 
poor and destitute aud exclude all humanitarian activities 
.. . which are maintained to care fo~ the physical and mental 
Iycil-being of the ree:ipients, and which make it less likely that 
such recipients will become burdens on society." (Fredericka 
Home for the Aged v. County of San Diego, S1lpra, 35 Ca1.2d 
789,793.) 
Lee Mishkin contends, however, that the testator's purpose 
was to encourage the commission of political crimes and that 
) 
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therefore the trust is illegal. The admiuistrator and amici 
curiae contend, on the contrary, that the testator's purpose 
was to encourage constitutionally protected freedom of speech 
and expression and to protect the right of lawful dissent and 
that these are valid charitable purposes. They contend that 
the illustrations the testator set forth in his will, convictioIls 
of violating the Smith Act, convictions of contempt of con-
gressional committees, convictions for violating laws dealing 
with test oaths, convictions for engaging in labor-union activi-
ties, all involve areas where the lines between constitutionally 
protected activity and illegal activity are vaguely defined. 
(Cf., e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 [71 S.Ct. 857, 
95 L.Ed. 1137], with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 
[77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L .Ed.2d 1356]; Scales v. United States, 
367 U.S. 203 [81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782], with Nota v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 290 [81 S.Ct. 1517, 6 L .Ed.2d 836] ; 
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 [79 S.Ct. 1081, 
3 L.Ed.2d 1115], with N.A.A .C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 
[78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488].) They assert that the will can 
reasonably be interpreted as referring only to parents who 
have been unlawfully convicted for engaging in constitu-
tionally protected activity and that thereby any question of 
illegality can be avoided. 
We need not search for any such limitation in the language 
of the will to sustain the trust. We may assume that the 
testator intended to benefit the children of those convicted 
of even valid laws of which he disapproved and that his 
motive in part at least was to encourage challenges to such 
laws by violations of them. [7] It is the purpose for which 
the property is to be used, however, not the motives of the 
testator that determines whether a trust is a valid charitable 
trust. (Estate of Bntin, 81 Cal.App.2d 76, 83 [183 P.2d 304] ;' 
Matter of Frasch, 245 N.Y. 174, 182 [156 N.E. 849]; Archam-
bault's Estate, 308 Pa. 549, 555 [162 A. 801]; Woodstown 
Nat. Bank &- Tmst Co. v. Snelbaker, 136 N.J.Eq. 62 [40 A.2d 
222, 224], affd., 133 N.J.L. 256 [44 A.2d 210]; Jackson v. 
Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 568-569; see Estate of 
Loring, 29 Ca1.2d 423, 434-435 [175 P .2d 524] ; In re Little's 
Estate, 403 Pa. 534 [170 A.2d 106, 107-108] ; Chamberlain v. 
Van Horn, 246 Mass. 462, 464 [141 N.E. 111]; Baker v. 
Hickman, 127' Kan . 340 [273 P. 480, 481, 68 A.L.R. 743] ; 
Rest. 2d Trusts, § 368, com. d; 4 Scott on Trusts [2d ed.] 
§§ 348, 368, pp. 2551, 2628; 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, 
§ 364, pp. 30-34.) 
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[8] Assistance to the minor beneficiaries of the trust in 
this case is a valid charitable purpose. The risk that sueh 
assistance may serve to encourage crime is far more remote 
than that which the Legislature itself may have created by 
provision for the care of children that extends to those of 
convicted prisoners. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1500.) The 
benefit to society offered by the testator transcends whatever 
criticism there may be of his motives, which have died with 
him. 
The order is reversed. The appeal from the order denying 
the motion for new trial is dismissed. (Prob. Code, § 1240; 
Estate of Duke, 41 Cal.2d 509, 515-516 [261 P.2d 235] .) 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J ., and Dooling, J., concurred. 
WHITE, J .-I dissent. 
Undoubtedly a valid trust may be created where its pur-
poses are to effect changes in existing laws. (See 4 Scott on 
Trusts [2d ed.] § 374.4, p. 2677; 2A Bogert on Trusts, § 378, 
pp. 168-170.) 
As was said by this court in Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 
650-651 [266 P. 526] ; "The trend of modern authority has 
been toward the upholding of trusts which have for their 
object the creation of a more enlightened public opinion, 
with a consequent change in laws having to do with human 
relations and rights in a republic such as ours . ... To hold 
that a change in a law is in effect an attempt to violate that 
law would discourage improvement in legislation and tend 
to compel us to continue indefinitely to live under laws de-
signed for an entirely different state of society. Such view 
is opposed to every principle of our government based on the 
theory that it is a government 'of the people, by the people 
and for the people,' and fails to recognize the right of those 
who make the laws to change them at their pleasure when 
circumstances seem to require. With the wisdom of the pro-
posed change the courts are not concerned." 
However, recognition cannot be given to a trust as valid 
where its purpose is illegal. Therein lies the vice of the trust 
now engaging our attention. It not only encourages but offers 
an inducement for violation of the criminal law. In the Re-
statement of Trusts is found the following cogent statement: 
"A trust lvltich t (' nds to induce a breach of the criminal law 
is invalid. Thus, a trust of property to be applied to the 
paymf'lIt of fine :'; or pr rsons convicted of criminal offenses ... 
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is invalid." (Emphasis added.) And in 4 Scott on Trusts 
(2d ed.) section 377 at page 2729, it is said: "A trust cannot 
be creatcd for a purpose which is illegal. The purpose is 
illegal if the trust property is to be med for an object which 
is ill violation of the criminal law, or if the trust tends to 
induce the commission of crime, or if the accomplishment of 
the purpose is otherwise against public policy. Questions of 
public policy are not fixed and unchanging, but vary from 
time to time and from place to place. A trust fails for ille-
gality if the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust is 
regarded as against public policy in the community in which 
the trust is created and at the time whcn it is created. Wherc 
a po/·icy is articulated in a statlltc making certain conduct II 
a criminal offcnse, then, of C01lrse, a trllst is illegal if its per-
formance involves sllch criminal cond1lct, or if it tends to en-
courage such conduct. Thus, in an early English case a be-
quest to trustees' to make seats for poor people to beg in by 
the highway' was held invalid since such begging was a 
criminal offense. 
"A trust is illegal, even if it does not involve the perform-
ance of an illegal act by the trustees, if the natural result of 
the performance of the trust would be to induce the commis-
sion of crime. Thus a bequest to purchase the release of 
persons committed to prison for nonpayment of fines under 
the game laws was held illegal." (Emphasis added.) 
In my opinion, it would do violence to reason and challenge 
credulity to say that the object of the trust with which we 
are here concerned is to bring about a change in the law by 
lawful and orderly means. On the contrary the testator, 
,,·ith care and precision, under·took to instruct his trustees 
that those who would violate certain named existing penal 
statutes, or commit any crime or misdemeanor which the 
testator terms "of a political nature," and is convicted 
thereof, were to be rewarded by the furnishing of aid to their 
<:hildren. That the trust I)l'Operty in the case at bar was to 
be used in the performance of the trust to encourage if not 
induce the commission of crime, to me seems manifest, and 
therefore, consonant with the foreg-oing reasoning and author-
ities, it cannot be held to be a valid charitable trust. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Schauer, J.,_ and McComb, .J., concurred. 
